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Toscano: SLAPPS Across America

SLAPPS ACROSS AMERICA
Jack Toscano*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan was meant to protect our fundamental right to free speech
from defamation lawsuits. However, Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation, known as SLAPPS, continue to chill free speech
through weak but expensive to defend defamation lawsuits. In
response to SLAPPs many states have passed anti-SLAPP statutes
that are meant to identify SLAPPs, quickly dismiss SLAPPS, and
punish plaintiffs who bring SLAPPs. A difficult issue for federal
courts throughout the country is whether these state anti-SLAPP
statutes should apply in federal courts. This Note examines the
Supreme Court opinions in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., as well as various lower court
opinions, and concludes that state anti-SLAPP statutes should not
apply in federal court until Congress creates a federal anti-SLAPP
statute.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Free Speech is an essential part of American democracy. 1 But
free speech like all other fundamental rights is not unlimited. 2 A
traditional limit to free speech is defamation law. Defamatory
publications were not viewed as protected by the First Amendment
because of their little social value. 3 The exact formulation for
defamation varied but generally required that: defendant must make
*

J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2022. I would
like to thank my Note Editor, Mike Petridis, my Faculty Advisor, Professor Laura
Dooley for their assistance throughout this process. I would also like to thank my
friends and family for their support during my law school career.
1
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring).
2
Id. at 373.
3
Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 255–57 (1952).
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(1) a defamatory statement (2) of and concerning the plaintiff (3) and
published to a third party; truth would be a defense but it was the
defendant’s burden to prove truth and a good faith belief in the truth
of the statements was not a defense regardless of the defendant’s care
in attempting to verify the statement’s truth. 4
This view of defamation law began to change in the Supreme
Court’s landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.5 In New York
Times the Supreme Court recognized the potential chilling effect of
defamation law.6 Defamation law can create a chilling effect on free
speech by perpetuating “a system of censorship” where people
remain silent rather than risk the threat of civil liability. 7 Requiring
individuals to guarantee the truth of all of their statements would lead
to self-censorship that would dampen the public debate guaranteed by
the First Amendment.8
In response to this fear of self-censorship, New York Times
and its progeny transformed the substantive law of a defamation
claim by requiring Plaintiffs to prove more elements to make a
successful defamation claim. Plaintiffs who are public figures must
now in addition to the common law elements prove that the
statements were made with actual malice, prove the defamatory
statement was false, and, at a minimum in some cases, prove that the
defamatory statement was made with negligence. 9 These substantive
changes to defamation law make it much more difficult for plaintiffs
to obtain a favorable verdict. However, many are still a concerned
about frivolous lawsuits that cannot be dismissed in the early stages
of litigation.10

4

See Rod Smolla, Rights and Liabilities in Media Content § 6:1 (2d ed. 2020).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6
Id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
7
See David A. Anderson, Note, Libel And Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev.
424-25 (1975).
8
See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
9
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986) (stating that plaintiffs have the burden of proving
falsity in a defamation claim if they are a public figure or suing a media defendant
for speech that is a matter of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (allowing states to define the standard of liability for defamation of
private plaintiffs as long as it is not strict liability).
10
Coalition of Supporters, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://antislapp.org/coalition (last visited August 31, 2021) (listing organizations in favor of
legislation against frivolous lawsuits targeting free speech rights).
5
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Indeed, for some plaintiffs in a defamation action, the goal is
not to prevail on the merits but to harass defendants and chill free
speech.11 This is known as a strategic lawsuit against public
participation or SLAPP.12 A SLAPP lawsuit often occurs when a
wealthy public figure, files a meritless lawsuit in order to silence
criticism and target the defendant’s financial resources.13 An
excellent explanation and example of SLAPP lawsuits can be found
in a segment by John Oliver where he talks about a SLAPP lawsuit
by Bob Murray against HBO.14
The segment criticized Bob Murray, a coal mining executive,
who was sued after several coal miners died following the collapse of
a mine shaft.15 The segment described Murray as “someone who
looks like a geriatric Dr. Evil” and “arranged for a staff member to
dress up in a squirrel costume and deliver the message ‘Eat Shit,
Bob!’”16 The segment was a reference to a statement made by one of
Murray’s disgruntled employees.17 Eventually, the lawsuit was
dismissed, but it was still expensive and time-consuming for HBO
due to the appeals process.18 The lawsuit cost HBO $200,000 in legal
fees and tripled its libel insurance despite the lawsuit’s lack of
merit.19 This lawsuit was likely a SLAPP because it was filed by a
wealthy public figure, in response to public criticism, specifically in a
state without an anti-SLAPP law (West Virginia), and was generally
without merit.20
11

See Eric Simpson, Comment, SLAPP-Ing Down the Right to A Jury Trial: AntiStrategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and the Seventh Amendment, 48 U.
TOL. L. REV. 169 (2016).
12
Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents
the Application of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1201, 1205 (2015).
13
What is a SLAPP?, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://antislapp.org/what-is-a-slapp (last visited April 10, 2020).
14
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: SLAPP Suits (HBO Television broadcast
Nov. 21, 2019).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See The Marshall County Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124, 2018 WL 11243736,
at *14 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) (dismissing Murray’s lawsuit at the motion
to dismiss stage for failing to sufficiently plead any elements of a defamation
claim).
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In response to SLAPPs, states have gone beyond the
substantive defamation law to protect defendants by enacting antiSLAPP statutes.21 Anti-SLAPP statutes seek to protect defendants by
giving them extra procedural tools to quickly dismiss claims, allow
defendants to appeal before a final judgment, recover attorney’s fees,
and limit discovery.22 In essence anti-SLAPP statutes deter SLAPPs
by limiting the monetary and time costs associated with defending
SLAPPS, as well as punishing plaintiffs that try to use meritless
lawsuits to silence their critics.
An example is California’s Anti-SLAPP motion statute which
allows a defendant to file a special motion to strike that must be
granted when there is a lawsuit: (1) “arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech”
and (2) the plaintiff fails to establish “there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail.”23 This Note will focus on defamation, but antiSLAPP statutes apply to any state claims arising from the exercise of
free speech or the right of petition; anti-SLAPP motions are not
limited to defamation claims and can sometimes even be applied to
contract claims.24 Essentially, this statute forces a plaintiff to prove
that he or she can succeed in a lawsuit related to a defendant’s free
speech rights before full discovery is completed. If the anti-SLAPP
motion to strike is granted the claims that it applies to are dismissed
and the defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees.25
Most defamation claims and other related claims that can be
subject to anti-SLAPP statutes are tried in state courts because they
arise under state law. Anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply to federal
claims.26 Sometimes, claims that can be subject to anti-SLAPP
statutes are tried in federal courts due to either diversity jurisdiction
or supplemental jurisdiction. 27 However, the federal circuits are split
21

See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT,
http://www.anti-SLAPP.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2020) (listing every state and territory with anti-SLAPP legislation).
22
See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(detailing the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute).
23
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2021).
24
See Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708-710 (Cal. 2002) (explaining the
“arising from” prong of the anti-SLAPP statute and explaining how a breach of
contract claim satisfied the prong).
25
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16.
26
In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41, 47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
27
Eric Simpson, supra note 11, at 169.
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as to whether they are required to apply state anti-SLAPP statutes.
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 28 and Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co.29 state anti-SLAPP statutes should not be applied in federal
court.30 Together, these two cases explain when state procedural
statutes cannot be applied in federal courts because of the Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins31 doctrine.32 Anti-SLAPP statutes directly conflict with
Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), Rule 12(d), and Rule 56.33 All of
these rules regulate procedure as prescribed by the Rules Enabling
Act.34 Therefore anti-SLAPP statutes, as state procedural rules,
should only be applied in state courts.
This Note will argue that anti-SLAPP statutes are not
applicable in federal court because they are procedural rules and
conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part II of this
Note will explore the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shady Grove and
the two potential tests for resolving conflicts between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and state statutes. Part III of this Note will
explain the circuit split among the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal in determining whether to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in
federal court. Part IV will explain why anti-SLAPP statutes should
not be applied in federal court. Finally, Part V will consider the
future of anti-SLAPP legislation.

28

559 U.S 393 (2010).
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
30
See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337 (explaining that after applying the reasoning of
Shady Grove and Sibbach that a federal court may not apply the D.C. anti-SLAPP
statute).
31
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
398 (2010) (explaining that the
federal rule governs if it “answers the question
in dispute”); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (explaining that the
validity of a federal rule depends on “whether a rule really regulates procedure.”).
33
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018)
(declining to apply anti-SLAPP statutes because they conflict with FRCP Rules 8,
12, and 56).
34
Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (The Rules Enabling Act gives the Supreme Court the
authority to promulgate rules of procedure, so long as those rules do not change any
substantive rights.).
29
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SHADY GROVE’S TEST FOR CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE
STATUTES AND FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Erie doctrine refers to a series of decisions by the
Supreme Court that explain when state law must be applied in federal
courts in diversity actions. 35 Erie’s tenets dictate that when a federal
law does not control, federal courts are bound by the decisions of a
state’s highest court and state statutes on matters of state substantive
law, and there is no federal general common law. 36 In Shady Grove,
the issue was the conflict between a New York statute and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 37 The conflict occurred when a federal
court sitting in diversity heard a class action lawsuit. 38 The New
York statute did not allow the lawsuit to continue because the statute
contained an additional requirement that class action lawsuits may
not be used to recover statutory penalties. 39 However, if Rule 23 was
applied, the lawsuit could continue because it did not include a bar on
class action lawsuits to recover statutory penalties.40 The Court used
the Erie doctrine framework to decide if Rule 23 or the New York
statute should apply.41 Parts I and II-A of Shady Grove, which held
that New York’s class action statute conflicts with Rule 23, had the
support of five members of the Court rendering its opinion binding
while the rest of the opinion failed to gain a majority.42 The Supreme
Court used a two-part test to answer the question. 43 The first part of
the test examines whether the state statute and the federal rule
“attempts to answer the same question.” 44 First, the court identifies a
procedural question.45 Then it asks whether a federal rule answers
the procedural question.46 If the federal rule answers the procedural
35

See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
37
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
38
Id.
39
Id; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901 (McKinney 1975).
40
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398.
41
Id.
42
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 395-96 (Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court only in regard to Parts I and II–A and wrote an opinion with the Chief
Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor for Parts II–B and II–D).
43
Id. at 398 (“The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove's suit may proceed
as a class action.”).
44
Id. at 399.
45
Id. at 398.
46
Id.
36
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question, the court applies the federal rule. 47 If the federal rule is
ambiguous because it can have two different meanings, then a court
should read the rule in a way that prevents it from violating the Rules
Enabling Act.48 However, a court should not contort or read
ambiguity into an unambiguous rule so that it can apply the state rule
or statute.49 Rule 23 allows “any plaintiff in any federal civil
proceeding to maintain a class action” lawsuit if its requirements are
met.50 If the federal rule is unambiguous, the rule must be given its
full effect.51 Since Rule 23 is unambiguous, it will control any state
statute that tries to change the requirements of maintaining a class
action lawsuit.52 The focus of the analysis is entirely on the scope of
the federal rule based on its text and purpose.
In response to the dissent, the majority lists several reasons
why federal courts should not speculate about the purpose of a state
statute when deciding whether a federal rule preempts or answers the
same question as a state statute. 53 First, the question of whether a
federal statute or rule preempts a state statute is a federal question. 54
This renders pronouncements by a state’s supreme court on the
purpose of a rule to be unhelpful in federal court or jurisdiction. 55
Second, “federal judges would be condemned to poring through state
legislative history — which may be less easily obtained, less
thorough, and less familiar than its federal counterpart.” 56 Third,
state statutes are often passed with multiple purposes in mind. 57 In
some cases, “one State's statute could survive preemption (and
accordingly affect the procedures in federal court) while another
State's identical law would not, merely because its authors had
different aspirations.”58
47

Id.
Id. at 405-06.
49
Id. at 406.
50
Id.
51
See Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1217 (“Scalia gave great breadth to the federal
rule by analyzing it according to its plain language”).
52
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
53
Id. at 402 (The dissent characterizes the state statute as being about a remedy
rather than a class action because its “purpose is to restrict only remedies.”).
54
Id. at 405.
55
Id. at 404.
56
Id. at 405.
57
Id. at 404.
58
Id.
48
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In summary, using statutory interpretation to determine if a
state procedural statute is a hidden substantive statute is best left to
state courts. Federal courts should only interpret federal statutes, and
when dealing with state procedural statutes, federal courts should
only focus on the text to decipher whether the statute is procedural. 59
If the federal rule is ambiguous and has a reasonable reading that
would allow it to coexist with a state statute, federal courts should
apply them both.60 If the only reasonable reading of a federal rule is
one that conflicts with a purely textual reading of a state statute the
court should apply the federal rule. 61 Federal courts should not try to
infer that the state statute is actually substantive rather than
procedural when it clearly tries to answer the same procedural
question as the federal rule.62 Five justices joined this part of the
decision.63
The Supreme Court was divided on the second part of the test
which focuses on whether the federal rule in question violates the
Rules Enabling Act. 64 Justice Scalia explained that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) the Court is only authorized to promulgate rules that do
“not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 65 Since §
2072 restrains the Court in this way, Scalia reasoned the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure. 66
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion applies a simple and
formalist test that is consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent. 67
To determine whether a rule “ really regulates procedure,” the rule
must control “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
59

Id.
Id. at 405-06.
61
See id. at 406. There is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23 and the Court
refused to analyze the state statute’s purpose outside of its statutory language and
procedural effect. Id. at 405 n.7.
62
See id. (criticizing the dissent for invalidating Rule 23 based on the substantive
effect of a clearly procedural state statute that conflicted with Rule 23).
63
Id. at 395.
64
Id. at 398 (If a federal rule and state statute answer the same question the federal
rule applies “unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking
power.”).
65
Id. at 407 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
66
Id.
67
Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1217 (labeling the approach “formalist”); Abbas v.
Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion for four Justices strictly followed a prior Supreme Court
precedent.” (citation omitted)).
60
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recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them[.]” 68 “What matters is
what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only ‘the manner and the
means’ by which the litigants' rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it
alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate
[those] rights,’ it is not.”69 If the rule can be characterized as
affecting “the manner and the means” in which a party enforces
rights guaranteed by substantive law it is procedural under the Rules
Enabling Act.70 The result of the procedural rule does not matter
because almost all procedural rules can affect a person’s substantive
rights.71 The substantive nature or purpose of the state law that
conflicts with the federal rule is not relevant to whether application of
the federal rule violates the Rules Enabling Act. 72 If a rule is
authorized by the Rules Enabling Act it is applied in all jurisdictions;
regardless of its effect on state-created rights.73
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed that Rule 23
applied in the instant case. 74 Justice Stevens also agreed with Justice
Scalia’s analysis on how a federal court should decide that a federal
rule conflicts with a state statute.75 However, Justice Stevens also
reasoned that some state statutes cannot be preempted in diversity
actions despite conflicting with a federal rule. 76 According to Justice
Stevens, the federal courts must apply a state statute if applying a
federal rule “effectively abridges, enlarges, or modifies a statecreated right or remedy.”77
Justice Stevens used the statutory language of the Rules
Enabling Act to create his rule. The Rules Enabling Act says, “such
68

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
69
Id. (quoting Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
70
Id.
71
Id. (“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most
procedural rules do.”).
72
Id. at 409 (“The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that the
substantive nature of New York's law, or its substantive purpose, makes no
difference.”).
73
Id. at 410.
74
Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75
Id. (joining Parts I and II-A of the Court’s opinion which explain how Rule 23
and the New York statute conflict because they answer the same procedural
question).
76
Id. at 416-17.
77
Id. at 422.
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rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”78
The key word is any because some state procedural statutes also
influence substantive rights. In Justice Stevens’ opinion, Congress
cannot tell states the “form that their substantive law should take.”79
Therefore, even if a state has a statute in a clearly procedural form,
the statute may still be substantive based on the outcome it seeks to
create.80 A state procedural rule would apply rather than a federal
rule because some state procedural rules are “so bound up with the
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that
substantive right or remedy.”81 Federal courts are expected to
consider the scope and purpose of a clearly procedural state statute
before applying a federal rule because federal courts may not apply a
federal rule that abridges a state defined right. 82
Justice Stevens created a guide for applying his test to
determine whether applying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
instead of a state statute would violate the Rules Enabling Act’s
prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”83 Justice Stevens starts with the assumption that a
state law in a procedural form is not substantive because a procedural
form strongly suggests “a judgment about how state courts ought to
operate and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and
remedies.”84 Justice Stevens also cautions that the “the bar for
finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one.” 85 The bar is high
because there would be heavy costs on federal courts trying to
discover the true substantive purpose of a state law, and having that
statute apply with a federal rule that seems to govern the same
procedural issue.86 This position echoes Justice Scalia’s belief that
federal courts should not focus on analyzing clearly procedural state
statutes that may have hidden substantive purposes.87
The Stevens’ Rules Enabling Act analysis continues with the
text of the state statute. In Shady Grove, it was clear based on the
78

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (emphasis added).
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 420.
80
Id. at 419-20.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
§ 2072.
84
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 404 (majority opinion).
79
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text of CPLR section 901(b) that it applied to New York laws, federal
laws, and the laws of other states. Section 901(b) prevents plaintiffs
from maintaining a class action lawsuit based on minimum statutory
damages regardless of what statute imposed the statutory damages.88
In Justice Steven’s view, this is evidence that the statute is procedural
because it affects substantive rights not created by New York. 89 The
New York courts interpreted the statute in the same way as Justice
Stevens.90 The legislative history showed some specific state purpose
by protecting defendants from potential “annihilating punishment”
when the class action lawsuits are combined with statutory
damages.91 The protection given to defendants is a potential limit on
remedies which would be substantive under the Erie doctrine.92
However, another purpose of the statute could be a more general
policy of preventing unnecessary class action lawsuits regardless of
the source of law in New York courts.93
Overall, Justice Stevens found that the legislative history of
CPLR section 901(b) was only evidence that legislators wanted to
make it harder for certain litigants to file class action lawsuits in New
York courts.94 Making it harder to file certain lawsuits is the same
class of policy concerns “that might go into setting filing fees or
deadlines for briefs.”95 Justice Stevens reasoned that when federal
courts are faced with clear textual evidence that a state statute is
procedural but has an ambiguous legislative history, a federal court
should conclude that the statute is procedural rather than
substantive.96 A court must apply the federal rule if a textually
procedural statute only has speculative substantive concerns that
conflict with a federal rule.97
In summary, when deciding whether application of a federal
rule that conflicts with a state statute would “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right” federal courts have been given two
88

Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b)(McKinney 1975).
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 434.
92
See id. at 425 (according to Stevens states can construct substantive rules in a
form that appears procedural).
93
Id. at 435.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 436.
97
Id.
89
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tests.98 First, Justice Scalia’s plurality test asks whether the federal
rule really regulates procedure.99 If the federal rule regulates
procedure the court applies the federal rule. 100 Second, Justice
Stevens’ test states that federal courts should apply the federal rule
unless there is little doubt that application of the federal rule alters a
state-created substantive right.101 The evidence that a state statute
created a substantive state-created right comes from three sources.
The strongest evidence is the text of the statute, the next source is the
decisions of state courts interpreting the statute, then the final source
is the legislative history of the state statute. 102 If the evidence is clear
that the state statute is substantive, it applies, and if the evidence is
not sufficient the federal rule will apply. 103
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPLICATION OF ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES IN FEDERAL COURTS

Shady Grove attempted to give lower courts a workable test
that would promote uniformity among the lower courts. However,
circuit courts and district courts across the country have been divided
on whether state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in federal courts.
The First and Ninth Circuits have found that state anti-SLAPP
statutes are applicable in federal courts. 104 However, the D.C.,
Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that state
anti-SLAPP statutes are not applicable in federal courts.105

98

28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
100
See id. at 410 (plurality opinion) (explaining that upon a finding that a rule
really regulates procedure and a conflict with a state statute the federal rule always
preempts the state statute).
101
Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring).
102
See id. at 431-436 (Stevens, J., concurring) (analyzing evidence of whether N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 901(b) is substantive).
103
See id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring) Justice Steven’s states that “[t]he mere
possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient.
There must be little doubt.” Id.
104
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999).
105
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2015); La
Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2020); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240,
242 (5th Cir. 2019); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885
99
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Federal Courts that Apply Anti-SLAPP

In Godin v. Schencks, 106 Godin commenced an action in the
Federal District Court of Maine for a violation of federal due process
rights and a state law defamation claim. 107 The defendant sought to
apply Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, known as section 556, in order to
dismiss the claim and recover attorney fees. 108 Specifically, section
556 gives a special process for dismissing claims that arise from the
exercise of a defendant's right to petition under the U.S. Constitution
or the Constitution of Maine. 109 The district court ruled that Maine’s
anti-SLAPP statute conflicted with Rules 12 and 56, and so it did not
apply in federal court.110 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in
federal court.111 The First Circuit reasoned that section 556 did not
answer the same question as Rules 12 and 56.112 The court
determined there was no issue in applying both the federal rules and
the state statute. 113 Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 are consistent with
anti-SLAPP procedure because they “do not purport to apply only to
suits challenging the defendants' exercise of their constitutional
petitioning rights.”114 The First Circuit views the anti-SLAPP
procedure as supplementing rather than conflicting with the federal
rules.115
The First Circuit, holding that Rules 12 and 56 do not conflict
with anti-SLAPP, also characterized the anti-SLAPP statute as being
substantive in nature rather than just procedural. While it may appear
procedural with its motion to strike, “Section 556 is ‘so intertwined
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule

F.3d 659, 673 (10th Cir. 2018); Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d
1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).
106
629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).
107
Id. at 80-81.
108
Id. at 81-82.
109
Id. at 82.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 88.
113
Id. (explaining that Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 do not attempt to answer the same
question as Section 556).
114
Id.
115
Id.
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56.”116 The First Circuit’s analysis of section 556 echoed Justice
Stevens’ concern that state procedure can sometimes be used as a
vehicle to protect substantive state-created rights.117 In addition, the
First Circuit found that applying the anti-SLAPP statute would “serve
the ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping
and inequitable administration of the laws.’” 118 If section 556 is not
applied in federal court, the law is unevenly applied because
defendants would not have access to the same defenses as they would
have in state court. 119 The First Circuit also found that not applying
anti-SLAPP would encourage forum shopping because a plaintiff
would bring a case to federal court instead of state court to avoid the
various burdens of anti-SLAPP such as having to potentially pay
defendant’s attorney’s fees, and not being able to use “the common
law's per se damages rule.”120
B.

Federal Courts that Do Not Apply Anti-SLAPP

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that an anti-SLAPP
statute could not apply in federal court in an opinion by then Circuit
Judge Kavanaugh. 121 In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC,122
Yasser Abbas, the son of the president of Palestine, brought a
defamation action against the Foreign Policy Group in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia.123 The District Court
applied the D.C. anti-SLAPP special motion and dismissed the
116

Id. at 89 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
117
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (“A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the
ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”).
118
Godin, 629 F.3d at 91 (quoting Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41
F.3d 764, 773 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 27 n.6 (1988))).
119
See Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 18, 942 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Me. 2008)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (1977) (“One who falsely publishes
matter defamatory of another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is
subject to liability to the other although no special harm results from the
publication.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2011) (requiring plaintiff to show
“actual injury.”).
120
Godin, 629 F.3d at 92.
121
Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
122
783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
123
Id.
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defamation claim, but the D.C. Circuit Court held that a federal court
must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of the D.C. anti-SLAPP
special motion to dismiss.124 The main issue on appeal was whether a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction may apply the D.C.
anti-SLAPP statute.125 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court
on other grounds by dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(6).126 The
D.C. Circuit declined to apply the anti-SLAPP statute because the
statute answers the same procedural question as Rule 12 and Rule 56
of the FRCP and Rules 12 and 56 do not violate the Rules Enabling
Act.127 The D.C. Circuit first identified a procedural question: under
what circumstances must a court dismiss a claim before trial?128
Rules 12 and 56 allow for dismissal only if the claim is not plausible
or there is no dispute of fact. 129 The D.C. anti-SLAPP statute tries to
answer the procedural question differently because it requires that a
plaintiff show a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that
neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56 requires.130 Since D.C.’s anti-SLAPP
statute answers the same procedural question as Rules 12 and 56,
Shady Grove commands that courts should apply the Federal Rules
instead of the anti-SLAPP statute unless Rule 12 or 56 violates the
Rules Enabling Act.131
Although the federal rules and state statutes conflict, the
analysis continues because § 2072(b) requires that Federal Rules do
not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 132 The D.C.
Circuit then had to decide what test it would apply to decide whether
Rule 12 or Rule 56 violated the Rules Enabling Act by modifying a
substantive right.133 The Circuit Court noted that the Supreme Court
in Shady Grove was split on this issue with the plurality opinion
giving one test, Justice Stevens giving a different test, and the other
four justices not addressing the issue. 134 The D.C. Circuit resolved
the split by applying the Sibbach test which is still binding
124

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1332.
126
Id. at 1340.
127
Id. at 1337.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1334.
132
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
133
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336.
134
Id.
125
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precedent.135 Identical to Justice Scalia’s plurality test, the Sibbach
test is “whether a rule really regulates procedure.” 136 The court then
applied the Sibbach test by holding that “pleading standards and rules
governing motions for summary judgment are procedural.” 137 While
the D.C. Circuit used the Sibbach test, it also referred to a part of
Shady Grove that characterized pleading standards and rules
governing summary judgment as procedural. 138 A federal court must
apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of an anti-SLAPP
statute because “Federal Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question
as the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, and those Federal Rules are valid under
the Rules Enabling Act.” 139
In Carbone v. Cable News Network,140 Davide Carbone, a
CEO of a medical center, brought a defamation suit against CNN
based on an allegedly false news report about the medical center. 141
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 9-11-11.1, requires that claims
related to a person’s exercise of free speech or right of petition under
the state or federal constitution be subject to a special motion to
strike.142 The Northern District of Georgia did not apply Georgia’s
anti-SLAPP statute’s motion to strike, and CNN appealed. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide whether the district
court erred in not applying section 9-11-11.1.143 In its decision, the
Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the judgment of the district court
and ruled that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute may not be applied in
federal court because it conflicts with Rules 8, 12, and 56.144 The
Eleventh Circuit ruled this way for several reasons. First, the court
identified the procedural issue, which was “whether Carbone's
complaint states a claim for relief supported by sufficient evidence to
avoid pretrial dismissal.”145 Together, Rules 8 and 12 address pretrial
dismissal before discovery and Rule 56 applies to pretrial dismissal
135

Id. at 1337.
Id.
137
Id.
138
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
404 (2010).
139
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337.
140
910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018).
141
Id. at 1347.
142
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2016).
143
See Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1349.
144
See id. at 1348.
145
Id. at 1350.
136
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after discovery.146 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Georgia’s antiSLAPP procedure conflicts with the federal rules by imposing a
probability to prevail requirement
different from the plausibility
standard and the genuine dispute of material fact standard. 147 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that together Rules 8, 12, and 56 “provide
a comprehensive framework governing pretrial dismissal and
judgment.”148 Thus, “there is no room for any other device for
determining whether a valid claim is supported by sufficient evidence
to avoid pretrial dismissal.”149 Only Congress can create exceptions
to this “comprehensive framework” through statutes or other rules of
civil procedure such as Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act.150 The Eleventh Circuit characterized Rules 8 and
12(b)(6) as creating affirmative requirements to discovery if its
requirements are met.151 Rule 56 then creates a right to a trial on the
merits if plaintiffs meet their burden. 152 “[T]here is no room for any
other device for determining whether a valid claim [is] supported by
sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal.” 153
IV.

FEDERAL COURTS MAY NOT APPLY STATE ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 and State
Anti- SLAPP Statutes, Same Question, Different
Answer.

A federal court may not apply a state statute if a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure “answers the same question” as the state statute
unless the federal rule violates the Rules Enabling Act. 154 Rules 12
and 56 provide the pretrial procedural hurdles a party must overcome
before the case goes to trial.155 The Supreme Court has carefully
146

Id.
Id.
148
Id. at 1351.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1353.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 1351.
154
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399
(2010).
155
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
147
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explained how Rules 12 and 56 must be applied by federal courts to
screen out weak claims without sufficient factual allegations or
sufficient evidence for a trial. 156 How the rules apply is a uniform
and comprehensive procedure that, similar to every other Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, must be applied to “all civil actions” in
district courts.157 However, state anti-SLAPP statutes place an
additional pretrial burden that cannot be reconciled with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.158
Before discovery, a defendant can challenge the legal
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint by filing a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 159 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion’s standard of
review requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts if taken as true
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”160 A plausible
claim has factual content that would allow a court to reasonably infer
“that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 161 This is
not a probability requirement, but it does require more than a mere
possibility that the defendant is liable. 162 A complaint with sufficient
plausible factual matter “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely.’”163 However, a mere formulaic statement
of the elements of a claim with only legal conclusions, bare
speculation, or naked assertions, will not survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the complaint as a whole is supported by

156

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that just
stating the elements of a claim will not allow a claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.”).
157
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
158
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
159
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford,
J., dissenting). Judge Watford, joined by four other judges, dissented from the en
banc decision not to bring the Ninth Circuit in line with Shady Grove. Id. (“Neither
of those decisions is consistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent, and both
warranted reexamination by the court sitting en banc.”)
160
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
570).
161
Id. at 678.
162
Id.
163
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556.
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sufficient factual matter. 164 Rule 12(b)(6) comprehensively answers
the procedural question of what needs to be in a complaint before a
plaintiff can proceed to discovery. 165 Anti-SLAPP procedure tries to
answer the same procedural question as Rule 12(b)(6), which is
whether a plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to avoid pretrial
dismissal, but in a different way. 166
Anti-SLAPP statutes treat causes of action based on a
defendant’s right to petition or free speech differently from all other
causes of action unlike Rule 12(b)(6).167 According to Shady Grove,
when Congress creates exceptions to particular rules, that is evidence
that a rule applies generally. 168 An exception to Rule 23’s
requirements for the certification of class action lawsuits is 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(1)(B).169 A similar exception to Rule 12(b)(6)’s general
plausibility standard is Rule 9. 170 Rule 9(b) requires that “a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.”171 Another exception to Rule 12’s pleading standard is the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.172 This Act
modified pleading standards in some securities cases. 173 Rule 12
generally applies when evaluating the merits of a complaint except in
specific circumstances.174 Only Congress can create exceptions to
Rule 12’s general rule which applies to all cases not covered by an
exception.175 Anti-SLAPP conflicts with Rule 12 by creating a

164

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
See id. at 678-79.
166
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
167
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering 2021); GA. C ODE ANN. § 9-1111.1(b)(1) (2020).
168
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
400 (2010) (“The fact that Congress has created specific exceptions to Rule 23
hardly proves that the Rule does not apply generally. In fact, it proves the opposite.
If Rule 23 did not authorize class actions across the board, the statutory exceptions
would be unnecessary.”).
169
Id.
170
See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir.
2018) (characterizing Rule 9 “as exceptions to the general rule” to the requirements
of a sufficient complaint).
171
FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
172
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
165
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heightened pleading standard that applies to particular causes of
action.
Anti-SLAPP procedure directly conflicts with Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 176 Rule 56 answers the procedural
question of when a claim can be dismissed after the beginning of
discovery but before trial. 177 Rule 56 requires that a court “grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”178 Before granting a summary judgment motion,
a court must grant an “adequate time for discovery” and only requires
that a party with the burden of proof at trial designate specific facts
showing that there is an issue for trial. 179
Some anti-SLAPP statutes are different from summary
judgment because they impermissibly put the burden of persuasion
on plaintiffs before a trial. 180 The burden of persuasion is “[a] party’s
duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors
that party.”181 Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute, section 554.02,
explicitly puts the burden of persuasion on the party responding to a
motion to dismiss.182 Section 554.02 requires the responding party to
produce evidence and persuade a judge before trial that the party has
“clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are
not immunized from liability.”183 Additionally, a judge is not
required to make factual inferences in favor of the party responding
to the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.184 Ultimately, this burden on
the responding party may result in the dismissal of a claim when
there is an issue of material fact.185 This is different from summary
judgment because issues of material fact preclude summary

176

See id. at 1334.
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2018).
178
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
179
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986).
180
See Unity Healthcare, Inc. v. Cty. of Hennepin, 308 F.R.D. 537, 542 (D. Minn.
2015).
181
Burden of Persuasion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
182
MINN. STAT. § 554.02 (2021).
183
Id.
184
Unity Healthcare, 308 F.R.D. at 541.
185
Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 848 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn.
2014).
177
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judgment, and when ruling on summary judgment a judge must make
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.186
An anti-SLAPP motion also stays discovery unless a party
shows “good cause” for specified discovery. 187 This good cause
requirement for specified discovery is a very restrictive standard that
is like “oil to the water of Rule 56’s more permissive standard” for
discovery.188 Rule 56 does not put a restrictive “good cause” hurdle
on plaintiffs seeking discovery if they have already complied with the
requirements of Rule 8. 189 For Rule 56, discovery is the norm, but
under anti-SLAPP procedure, discovery is the exception. 190 Since
Rule 56 does not put a “good cause” burden on a party seeking
discovery, but anti-SLAPP procedure does, there is a direct collision
between the FRCP and anti-SLAPP.191
Furthermore, anti-SLAPP statutes impose a probability to
prevail standard that conflicts with Rules 12 and 56.192 The
probability to prevail standard is one that “contemplates a
substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff's probability of
prevailing on his claims.”193 An anti-SLAPP statute applied in
federal court creates a Rule12(b)(6) “plus” standard, that is more
difficult to meet than Rule12(b)(6), for causes of action dealing with
First Amendment rights. 194 Contrary to anti-SLAPP motions, Rule
12 only requires a plausible complaint at the pleading stage and Rule
56 permits summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”195 A court does not decide on material disputes when
applying Rule 12 or Rule 56 to dismiss a case before trial. However,
anti-SLAPP requires a court to consider factual materials in the
186

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-255 (1986).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2021).
188
Unity Healthcare, Inc. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 308 F.R.D. 537, 541 (D. Minn.
2015).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir.
2018).
193
Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
194
See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1720-ODE, 2017 WL
5244176, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017) (labeling Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute as
a Rule 12(b)(6) “plus” standard for actions with a first amendment nexus).
195
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986).
187
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pleadings, affidavits, and limited discovery to determine whether the
plaintiff has a probability to prevail on his claim.196
While most courts have focused on the conflicts between Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 with anti-SLAPP statutes, another rule directly
conflicts with anti-SLAPP statutes. Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a rarely discussed rule of conversion, directly
conflicts with anti-SLAPP statutes.197 Rule 12(d) allows courts to
consider matters outside of the parties’ pleadings when a party makes
a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion. 198 However, if the court considers
material outside the pleadings, the court must treat the motion “as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56.”199 If a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
12(c) motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment,
“parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.” 200
Rule 12(d) has a discretionary component and two nondiscretionary components.201 The discretionary component gives
courts the option to consider matters outside the pleadings after a
party makes a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion.202 The nondiscretionary components require that if a court does consider matters
outside the pleadings, a court must treat the motion as one for
summary judgment, and the court must allow a reasonable
opportunity to present all materials relevant to the motion. 203 The
procedural question that Rule 12(d) answers is what a court can do if
it considers any materials outside the party’s pleadings.204 Rule 12(d)
commands that a court treat the motion as one for summary judgment
but anti-SLAPP requires that a court use a standard different from
summary judgment.205
196

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (allowing courts to consider the
pleadings, affidavits, and specified discovery for good cause when deciding
whether to grant the motion).
197
Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235.
198
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1366 (3d ed. 2004).
199
FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
200
Id.
201
See Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235-36.
202
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, at § 1366.
203
Id.
204
Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235.
205
Id. at 1236.
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B. Addressing Arguments About Why Federal Courts
Should Apply Anti-SLAPP Procedure
A common argument to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in federal
court is that they serve as a distinct and beneficial supplement to
Rules 12 and 56.206 Anti-SLAPP procedure is a distinct supplement
to the Federal Rules because it can exist “side by side” with the
Federal Rules, and it only applies to specific defendants who have
been targeted on the basis of their free speech or right to petition.207
The argument further states that the anti-SLAPP standard is a
beneficial independent supplement to the Federal Rules that protects
certain defendants from the costs of litigation, but this position is a
policy argument that ignores the policy behind the more permissive
Federal Rules.208 Another common argument is that not applying
anti-SLAPP statutes encourages forum shopping and would burden
federal courts because plaintiffs would be encouraged to bring their
claims to federal court to avoid the burden of anti-SLAPP statutes.209
To a certain extent, this is true, but legal questions should not be
determined by workload, and fixing the potential forum shopping
should be done by the Supreme Court or by Congress.210
The Supreme Court has been very conscious of Rule
12(b)(6)’s role in protecting defendants from needless and expensive
discovery.211 Despite the potential costs of discovery, the Supreme
Court still recognizes that on a motion to dismiss all factual
assertions must be taken as true and that there is no probability
requirement at the pleading stage. 212 While it is theoretically possible
to apply Rules 12 and 56 along with anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss,
this ignores Rule 12(d).213 Rule 12(d) makes it clear once matters
outside the pleadings are presented, which anti-SLAPP generally
allow in the form of affidavits, a party’s only option is a motion for
summary judgment.214

206

See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id.
208
Id. at 88.
209
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010); La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 88.
210
Id.
211
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
212
Id. at 556.
213
See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010).
214
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, at § 1366.
207
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There is no doubt that protecting First Amendment rights is an
important policy interest. Ultimately, it is for Congress and not the
federal courts to determine whether there should be a procedural
mechanism to protect a person’s First Amendment rights; especially
one that is different from the Federal Rule’s more permissive
standard for pretrial dismissal of claims. 215
Even without anti-SLAPP statutes, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure still have efficient ways to dismiss weak and frivolous
defamation claims that threaten free speech before a trial. This Note
has emphasized that Rule 12(b)(6)’s “plausibility standard” is very
different from anti-SLAPP procedure because it is easier to meet.
However, it should also be understood that it remains a significant
barrier for plaintiffs asserting their claims in general.216 Particularly,
the formal pleading requirements created by Ashcroft v. Iqbal217 have
resulted in people experiencing a higher rate of dismissal of their
claims.218 The current standards applied in federal court are high
enough to create a difficult time for plaintiffs to reach discovery,
regardless of anti-SLAPP statutes.
A defamation claim’s evidentiary standards, including the
requirement that a defamation claim of a public figure contain clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice, are applicable when a
court rules on summary judgment. 219 Thus, on summary judgment, if
plaintiffs do not have sufficient evidence of every element of their
claim, including the strict clear and convincing evidence standard of
actual malice in public figure cases, their claim will be dismissed
before trial.220 The failure of proof at the pretrial stage of an
essential element of the claim means there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.221 The result is that merely pointing out the plaintiff’s lack of
evidence by a defendant can be enough for summary judgment; Rule
215

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400
(2010) (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”); see La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2020) (labeling the
Federal Rules to be more “permissive”).
216
See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101
VA. L. REV. 2117, 2170 (2015).
217
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
218
Reinert, supra note 216, at 2170.
219
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
220
See id. at 254; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
221
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
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56 is a powerful tool for efficiently dismissing claims. 222 Important
to note is that Rule 56 procedure is different from the practice in
some states, which requires a defendant moving for summary
judgment to present evidence before a court will grant summary
judgment.223 While the concerns about SLAPP lawsuits chilling free
speech are an important concern, it is also important to remember that
the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already stack the deck in
favor of defendants with ways to dismiss defamation lawsuits at
early stages of litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasoning in Shady Grove and other Supreme
Court precedent, it is clear that state anti-SLAPP statutes should not
be applied in federal courts because anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 224 Specifically, anti-SLAPP
statutes conflict with the uniform and comprehensive procedure for
pretrial dismissal created by Rule 8, Rule 12, and Rule 56. 225
Together, these rules leave no room for an alternative standard for
pretrial dismissal unless Congress creates an exception or an
exception is created by the standard rule making process.226 The
states may not create an alternative procedure for federal courts even
if it is for a reason as venerable as protecting people’s First
Amendment rights.
However, the debate does not end there on anti-SLAPP
statutes. Recently, a member of Congress has introduced a federal
anti-SLAPP statute.227 Many other groups such as “law professors,
commentators, and businesses” have been in support of a federal antiSLAPP statute.228 With such a wide range of support Congress may
soon pass a federal anti-SLAPP statute. Before such a statute is
222
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223
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passed by Congress it would be a mistake for the federal circuits to
apply state anti-SLAPP statutes. We should all be concerned about
people like John Oliver and others whose free speech is being
suppressed by overly litigious plaintiffs; but we should also
remember that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already do a
good job at protecting defendants from weak claims.
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